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NOT INTERESTED?  A TRUSTEE LACKS “PARTY 
IN INTEREST” STANDING TO MOVE FOR AN 
EXTENSION OF THE NONDISCHARGEABILITY 
BAR DATE ON BEHALF OF CREDITORS 
Stephen C. Behymer* 
 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is designed to provide a financially distressed 
debtor with a “fresh start.”  Towards that end, an individual debtor’s debts 
are typically discharged during the case.  A creditor has only a short 
window of time in which to object to the dischargeability of its claims.  This 
bar date can only be extended for cause and upon the application of a 
“party in interest.”  Occasionally, a trustee will move for such an extension 
on behalf of the creditors.  There is a split, however, between the Fourth 
and Sixth Circuits regarding whether a trustee is a “party in interest” and, 
therefore, whether the trustee has standing to move for an extension. 
This Note analyzes the trustee’s role and interests in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case, as well as the policy interests underlying the U.S. 
bankruptcy system.  This Note concludes that a trustee is not a “party in 
interest” because a trustee does not have a financial, practical, or 
statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.  
Therefore, this Note finds that the Fourth Circuit is correct in holding that 
a trustee does not have standing to move for an extension of the 
nondischargeability bar date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a debtor who, experiencing financial hardship, can no longer pay 
his creditors.1  After weighing his options, the debtor decides to file a 
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In the typical 
Chapter 7 case, the debtor’s assets will be sold and distributed to his 
creditors, and the debtor will receive a discharge, “eliminat[ing] the 
debtor’s personal liability for all debts not excepted from discharge.”2  The 
deadline (the § 523 bar date) for each of his 350-plus creditors to file a 
complaint challenging the dischargeability of the individual debts they are 
owed (the nondischargeability complaint) is set for sixty days from the date 
of the creditors’ meeting.3  Imagine further that some of the creditors sleep 
on their rights by failing to timely file nondischargeability complaints or 
apply for an extension of the § 523 bar date.  Other creditors decide to rely 
on the bankruptcy trustee, who is planning to move for an extension of the 
§ 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors.  On the morning of the § 523 bar 
 
 1. This hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (4th 
Cir. 1986). 
 2. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 700.01, 700.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) governs the procedure for objecting to the dischargeability of an 
individual debt. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2006).  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c), 
which supplements 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), provides that “a complaint to determine the 
dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than sixty days after the first 
date set for the meeting of creditors under [11 U.S.C.] § 341(a).” FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).  
For a more thorough discussion of the procedure for objecting to the dischargeability of a 
debt, see infra Part I.C. 
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date, the bankruptcy trustee moves for an extension of the § 523 bar date on 
behalf of all 350-plus creditors, seeking to give the creditors additional time 
to object to the dischargeability of their claims. 
Should the bankruptcy court grant the trustee’s application for an 
extension?  Or, did the creditors err in relying on the trustee to obtain an 
extension?  Should their claims be discharged for failure to comply with the 
§ 523 bar date?  The answers to these questions depend on whether the 
trustee has standing to move for such an extension on behalf of the 
creditors.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) provides that only 
a “party in interest” has standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar 
date.4  But is a trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c)?  The Fourth 
and Sixth Circuits disagree on this issue.  The Fourth Circuit, in In re 
Farmer, held that the bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest” under 
Rule 4007(c).5  Conversely, in Brady v. McAllister, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” and, therefore, can move 
for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors.6  This circuit 
split has resulted in confusion among bankruptcy courts.7  The majority of 
bankruptcy courts to address this issue have aligned with the Fourth Circuit 
and held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule 
4007(c).8  Still, some of these bankruptcy courts have used other equitable 
powers to extend the § 523 bar date where a creditor reasonably relied on a 
prior bankruptcy court order granting a trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion.9 
 
 4. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). 
 5. In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 620–21. 
 6. Brady v. McAllister, 101 F.3d 1165, 1170 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 7. Compare Silverdeer, LLC v. Deckelbaum (In re Deckelbaum), No. 10-06021-8-JRL, 
2011 WL 5909331, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 17, 2011) (“The trustee is not a ‘party in 
interest’ under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and cannot extend the deadline for filing objections 
to the discharge of specific debts under § 523.”), Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 
388 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (acknowledging case law that questions whether a trustee has 
standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date, but nevertheless permitting the 
creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the debtor failed to object to the 
trustee’s motion for an extension of the § 523 bar date), Flanagan v. Herring (In re Herring), 
116 B.R. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990) (suggesting that a trustee is not a “party in interest,” 
but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the 
debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order granting an extension of the § 523 bar date), 
and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Tatum (In re Tatum), 60 B.R. 335 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (holding that the trustee’s motion for an extension of time in which 
to object to discharge does not extend the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors), with 
Ellsworth Corp. v. Kneis (In re Kneis), No. 08-18014(DHS), 2009 WL 1750101 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an extension of 
the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors). See generally Frati v. Gennaco, No. 10-11055-
PBS, 2011 WL 241973, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2011) (acknowledging the split between the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, but assuming for the purposes of their analysis that a bankruptcy 
trustee does have standing under Rule 4007(c)). 
 8. See, e.g., Silverdeer, LLC, 2011 WL 5909331, at *1; In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 
685 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010); Ruben, 194 B.R. at 391–92 (using its equitable powers to 
permit the creditors’ § 523 complaint to stand even though case law questions whether a 
trustee is generally a party in interest); Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315; Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 60 B.R. at 338. 
 9. See Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 (permitting a creditor’s § 523 complaint to stand 
where the creditor relied on an unappealed order of the bankruptcy court extending the § 523 
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Part I of this Note provides a background on bankruptcy law in the 
United States, focusing on those portions of the Bankruptcy Code that are 
relevant to the issue addressed by this Note:  whether a trustee has standing 
to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors.  Part 
II of this Note explores the Farmer and Brady decisions and the reasoning 
of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trustee has standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on 
behalf of creditors.  Part II also discusses how bankruptcy courts have 
responded to the Farmer and Brady decisions.  Part III of this Note argues 
that the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a trustee is not a 
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).10 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE:  GROWTH OF THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 7 LIQUIDATION 
This Note begins by providing a general background of the U.S. 
bankruptcy laws, with a focus on Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  Part I.A 
discusses the history and development of the U.S. bankruptcy laws, 
including the primary policy interests of the Bankruptcy Code.  Part I.B 
then provides a general overview of the structure of the current bankruptcy 
laws.  Next, Part I.C focuses its discussion more narrowly on Chapter 7 
bankruptcies, with an emphasis on the procedure for determining the 
dischargeability of an individual debt and the role of the bankruptcy trustee.  
Part I.D concludes by looking at the use and interpretation of the phrase 
“party in interest” throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. 
A.  Understanding the Bankruptcy Code 
This section briefly reviews the development of the U.S. bankruptcy 
laws.  It begins by exploring the history of bankruptcy in the United States 
and the development of the current debtor-friendly system.  This section 
then discusses the two major policy interests that permeate the current 
Bankruptcy Code. 
1.  History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States 
Today, bankruptcy is defined as the “statutory procedure by which a . . . 
debtor obtains financial relief and undergoes a judicially supervised 
reorganization or liquidation of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of 
creditors.”11  Bankruptcy laws have existed in America, in some form, since 
 
bar date based upon the trustee’s application); see also Ruben, 194 B.R. at 391–92 
(permitting the creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the debtor failed to 
object to the trustee’s motion for an extension of the § 523 bar date). 
 10. While § 523 is applicable to the entire Bankruptcy Code—and therefore this issue is 
relevant regardless of the type of relief sought under the Bankruptcy Code—this Note 
focuses on § 523 within a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.  There are two reasons for this.  First, 
this limitation will allow for a more refined and concrete exploration of the issues.  Second, 
most of the cases that address this issue, including both In re Farmer and Brady, were 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 
 11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 166–67 (9th ed. 2009). 
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the early colonial era.12  The bankruptcy laws have not, however, always 
looked as they do today.  Over the past two and a half centuries, bankruptcy 
in America has slowly transitioned from a collection of pro-creditor state 
laws, which were largely unsympathetic to the plight of the financially 
distressed debtor, to a more liberal federal system, which focuses on 
providing the debtor with a “fresh start” while simultaneously facilitating 
the fair and orderly collection of debts owed to creditors.13 
During the colonial era, debtors were generally viewed as quasi-
criminals.14  Defaulting debtors could be imprisoned indefinitely, and 
placed in jails alongside other criminals.15  In Pennsylvania, debtors were 
subject to public flogging.16  In New York, debtors could be branded with a 
“T,” designating them as thieves.17  Still, debtors were not without any 
remedial measures.  Some colonies and early states provided debtors with a 
discharge, releasing the debtors from their obligations to repay their 
outstanding debts.18  This form of relief was limited, however, and required 
consent by a majority or supermajority of the debtor’s creditors, in number 
and amount.19 
Prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, bankruptcy laws were left 
to the control and administration of the individual states.20  In fact, the 
Articles of Confederation never mentioned bankruptcy.21  During the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, however, the Founding Fathers were 
concerned with the lack of uniformity in the states’ administration of 
bankruptcy laws, which resulted in a federal bankruptcy power.22  Article I, 
 
 12. See John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy “Reform”:  The 21st 
Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 475–77 (2004). 
 13. See Uriel Rabinovitz, Note, Toward Effective Implementation of 11 U.S.C. § 
522(d)(11)(e):  Invigorating a Powerful Bankruptcy Exemption, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 
1531, 1534 (2009) (“[T]he current Bankruptcy Code is the product of historical evolution 
that was at least two centuries in the making:  what began as a tool to help creditors collect 
debts has evolved into a mechanism granting relief to downtrodden debtors.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Matejkovic & Rucinski, supra note 12, at 476; Charles Jordan Tabb, The 
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12 
(1995). 
 15. Matejkovic & Rucinski, supra note 12, at 475. 
 16. GEORGE W. KUNEY, MASTERING BANKRUPTCY 4 (2008); Rabinovitz, supra note 13, 
at 1528. 
 17. KUNEY, supra note 16, at 4; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1528. 
 18. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[1]. 
 19. John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 361, 
367–69 (1988).  At the time of the American Revolution, four colonies authorized a limited 
discharge from debt in their bankruptcy laws. Id. at 367.  In New York, from 1788 to 1811, a 
discharge required the consent of three-fourths of creditors. Id. at 368.  In South Carolina, a 
discharge required the consent of three-fourths of creditors in number and amount. Id. at 
367.  From 1749 to 1793, North Carolina authorized discharges to imprisoned debtors who 
took an oath of poverty. Id. at 368.  In addition, from 1756 to 1828, Rhode Island authorized 
a discharge to all imprisoned debtors in exchange for surrendering their real and personal 
property. Id. at 369. 
 20. See generally F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 33–66 (William 
S. Hein & Co. 2002) (1919) (discussing various bankruptcy laws of the colonies and states 
prior to the adoption of the Constitution). 
 21. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; NOEL, supra note 20, at 67. 
 22. See Tabb, supra note 14, at 13. 
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Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, referred to as the “Bankruptcy 
Clause,” authorizes Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”23  While this federal 
bankruptcy power was only sporadically used before 1898, the few and 
short-lived federal bankruptcy acts during the nineteenth century made 
important strides in liberalizing bankruptcy in the United States into a more 
debtor-friendly system.24 
The first national bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,25 
continued the creditor-oriented mindset of the colonial era.26  Under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, bankruptcy was involuntary, meaning that only 
creditors could initiate a bankruptcy case.27  Moreover, discharge under the 
Act was limited to merchants, traders, bankers, brokers, factors, 
underwriters, and marine insurers, and required two-thirds consent of the 
creditors, by number and amount.28  Beginning in 1841, however, the 
federal government began to enact more debtor-friendly bankruptcy 
legislation.29  For example, the Bankruptcy Act of 184130 permitted debtors 
to petition for voluntary bankruptcies.31  Moreover, the Bankruptcy Act of 
1841 was not limited to traders and merchants; instead, any individual 
debtor who was unable to repay his debts could petition for bankruptcy.32  
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,33 Congress not only provided for voluntary 
bankruptcy, but also eliminated the longstanding requirement of creditor’s 
consent to a discharge, recognizing the importance of providing relief to a 
financially distressed debtor.34  Today, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
197835 (the Bankruptcy Code), which established the current bankruptcy 
system, is widely considered a “much more debtor-friendly law.”36 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 24. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[2]; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, 
at 1528–30. 
 25. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
 26. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1529 (“The primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1800 was not to aid debtors, but rather to address attempts to defraud creditors.”). 
 27. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. at 19, 21–22; see also Rabinovitz, supra note 
13, at 1528. 
 28. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1, 36, 2 Stat. at 20, 31; see also 1 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[2][a]; Tabb, supra note 14, at 15 (“Before a discharge 
could be granted, the bankruptcy commissioners had to certify to the federal district judge 
that the debtor had cooperated, and two-thirds of the creditors, by number and by value of 
claims, had to consent to the discharge.”). 
 29. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1529–31. 
 30. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). 
 31. Id. ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. at 440–41; see also Tabb, supra note 14, at 16–18. 
 32. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. at 440–41; see also McCoid, supra note 19, 
at 361.  While the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was not limited to merchants, corporations were 
still excluded from seeking relief. Tabb, supra note 14, at 16–17. 
 33. ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 34. See id. ch. 541, §§ 4a, 14, 30 Stat. at 547, 550; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1530 
(“With this Act, Congress tried to make the discharge more readily attainable, eliminating 
the requirement for creditors’ consent to a discharge.”). 
 35. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended in 11 U.S.C.).  Congress has amended the Bankruptcy Code several times since 
1978. E.g., Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
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This is not to suggest that the current Bankruptcy Code ignores creditors’ 
interests.37  Rather, the current Bankruptcy Code provides debtor-friendly 
means of relief while simultaneously accounting for the interests of 
creditors.38  This dual approach was apparent with the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 200539 (the 
BAPCPA), which halted the pro-debtor trend, providing additional 
protection for creditors to ensure that only those debtors in critical need 
would be helped.40  Today, the current Bankruptcy Code focuses on 
providing relief to honest debtors in need, while creating a system designed 
to facilitate the orderly collection of debts owed to creditors.41 
2.  Policy Interests Underlying the Bankruptcy Code 
The analysis of whether a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with 
standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date requires 
consideration of the policy interests underlying the current Bankruptcy 
Code.  This section discusses those two major policy interests. 
As suggested in Part I.A.1, the Bankruptcy Code primarily serves two 
important policy interests:  (1) to provide the debtor with a fresh start, and 
(2) to facilitate the fair collection of debts owed to creditors.42  Even though 
 
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.); 
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1231); 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 36. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531 (quoting Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit 
Crisis:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of the American Bankruptcy Institute)); see 
also Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform:  Debtors’ 
Prison Without Bars or “Just Desserts” for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91, 95 
(2006) (“Even though the Bankruptcy Code significantly changed substantive bankruptcy, it 
did not alter the fundamental policy in favor of debtors.  In fact, some argue that it enhanced 
a policy in favor of debtors.”).  For a more detailed discussion of the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see Tabb, supra note 14, at 32–37. 
 37. See KUNEY, supra note 16, at 4–5 (noting that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 “is a notable reversal” of the Bankruptcy Code’s debtor-
friendly policy); Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531. 
 38. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C.). 
 40. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005) (“The purpose of the 
[BAPCPA] is to . . . ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”); see also 
KUNEY supra note 16, at 4–5 (arguing that the BAPCPA is a “notable reversal of the more 
liberal trend”); Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531 (arguing that the BAPCPA takes into 
account the interests of creditors). 
 41. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531. 
 42. 1 HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 2.3, at 17–18 
(10th ed. 2012). See generally Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047–48 (1987) (discussing five policy interests in the 
Bankruptcy Code:  bankruptcy as a collection device, the bankruptcy discharge as a reward 
to a worthy debtor, bankruptcy as a system to protect the interests of worthy creditors, 
bankruptcy as a system to rehabilitate the debtor, and bankruptcy as a system “designed to 
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early state and federal bankruptcy laws favored creditors, the interest in 
providing a fresh start to the debtor dates back to the founding of the United 
States.43  The Framers of the Constitution recognized that many debtors are 
in such a position that they cannot escape or overcome their debts on their 
own.44  The bankruptcy powers were granted under the Constitution, in 
part, so that the federal government could order that “a cloak be made to 
protect the debtor from the bitter winds of misfortune and the cruel assaults 
of his creditor.”45 
Today, the fresh start policy has grown into one of the most important 
rationales underlying the bankruptcy system.46  According to the fresh start 
theory, the aim of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide those individuals who 
have suffered financial hardship with “a new opportunity in life . . . 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”47  
The Bankruptcy code seeks to “allow the debtor to . . . resume being a 
contributing member of society.”48  The fresh start policy requires a final 
disposition of assets and claims against the debtor, so that the debtor can be 
confident in his expectation for relief from financial distress.49 
The fresh start policy does not, however, condone abuse by debtors.50  
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that a fresh start 
 
achieve economic efficiency in its allocation of the risk of loss . . . between debtor and 
creditor”). 
 43. NOEL, supra note 20, at 7–8. But see Tabb, supra note 14, at 43 (“The idea of a 
bankruptcy law as a means of providing a fresh start for distressed debtors was foreign to the 
framers.”). 
 44. NOEL, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
 45. Id. at 8. 
 46. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S 
234, 244 (1934); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225 
(1986). But see Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh 
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 70 (2006) (arguing that Chapter 7 bankruptcy does not 
rehabilitate many debtors sufficiently to provide them with a fresh start). 
 47. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S at 244. 
 48. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1534. 
 49. See State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“The strict time limitation placed upon creditors who wish to object to a debt’s 
dischargeability reflects the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of providing debtors with a fresh 
start.”); FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[Rule 4007(c)] 
defines a time certain when creditors may no longer come claiming that the debtor defrauded 
them and that certain debts should be non-dischargeable. . . .  The debtor can relax.”); 
Ichinose v. Homer Nat’l Bank (In re Ichinose), 946 F.2d 1169, 1172–73 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 50. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87.  The BAPCPA introduced the rigid “means test” to 
prevent abuse of the Bankruptcy Code by debtors who wanted to shirk the personal 
responsibility of repaying their debts. See Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 792 (2007) (arguing that it was a 
“poor decision” for Congress to enact the “means test,” and proposing an alternative test).  
Pursuant to the “means test,” a debtor’s ability to repay his or her loans is measured using an 
objective formula “that produces a straightforward presumption or nonpresumption of abuse 
of the bankruptcy process.” Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just a 
Mean Test”:  An Examination of the Requirement That Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Debtors Comply with Amended Section 707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 414 
(2008). 
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should only be granted to those debtors who have clean hands themselves.51  
Accordingly, a debtor who has acted improperly may not be entitled to a 
general discharge,52 or a bankruptcy court may determine that certain 
improperly obtained debts are excepted from discharge.53 
The second main function of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide for the 
fair distribution of the debtor’s assets to the creditors.54  This fair collection 
policy has a long history in bankruptcy law.55  In fact, the discharge was 
originally incorporated into English bankruptcy laws in 1705 as a means to 
encourage the debtor to cooperate in a bankruptcy case.56  Moreover, 
bankruptcy laws were seen as a method of avoiding “‘grab law[s]’ with a 
first-come, first-served characteristic, enabling the court to oversee an 
orderly liquidation of the debtor’s assets.”57  Today, the fair collection 
policy requires a prompt and orderly process of collection, liquidation, and 
distribution of the debtor’s assets to the creditors.58  As such, the 
Bankruptcy Code provides for a “ratable and equitable” distribution of a 
debtor’s nonexempt assets to creditors according to a priority list 
determined by Congress.59 
B.  The Structure of the Current Bankruptcy Laws:  Code and Rules 
Today, the current bankruptcy system is governed by the Bankruptcy 
Code, found in Title 11 of the U.S. Code.60  The Bankruptcy Code is the 
most important source of bankruptcy law in the United States.61  The 
Bankruptcy Code is broken down into nine chapters, six of which provide 
for some type of bankruptcy relief.62  Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain laws that 
are generally applicable to each of the six types of relief, including relevant 
definitions,63 provisions regarding the administration of a bankruptcy case 
 
 51. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87 (“[The Bankruptcy Code] limits the opportunity for a 
completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” (quoting 
Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244)). 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006) (setting forth the circumstances in which a debtor is not 
entitled to a discharge, including when the debtor has destroyed or concealed property with 
intent to defraud). 
 53. Id. § 523(a) (providing that certain types of debts, including those obtained through 
false pretenses or fraud, are nondischargeable). 
 54. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991); see also 1 SOMMER, supra note 
42, § 2.3, at 17–18; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1533. 
 55. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1532. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1533. 
 58. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
 59. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006) (setting forth the order of distribution of assets 
in the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case). 
 60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended in 11 U.S.C.); see also 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 1.4.1.1, at 8–9. 
 61. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 1.4.1.1, at 8. 
 62. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2] (noting that the chapters are 
usually odd numbered to allow room for expansion in the Bankruptcy Code). 
 63. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 
1.01[2][a]. 
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between its commencement and closing,64 and provisions regarding 
creditors’ claims and the claims process for each type of bankruptcy 
relief.65  Chapter 1 also grants courts the power to “carry out the provisions 
of this title” and gives courts the power to, “sua sponte, tak[e] any action or 
mak[e] any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement 
court orders or rules.”66 
The Bankruptcy Code provides six forms of bankruptcy relief, referenced 
according to their respective chapters therein.67  The three most common 
forms of relief are Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.68  Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, the type of relief explored in this Note, governs the liquidation 
of a debtor’s estate.69  In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor’s nonexempt 
property is collected, liquidated, and then distributed among creditors 
according to a priority scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.70  After 
the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor typically receives a 
general discharge, relieving him from the responsibility of repaying most of 
his outstanding debts.71 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the most common form of bankruptcy relief used 
by individual debtors.72  The next most common form of bankruptcy relief 
for the individual debtor is set forth in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.73  For qualifying individual debtors,74 Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
 
 64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301–308, 321–333, 341–351, 361–366; see also 1 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][a]. 
 65. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–511, 521–528, 541–562; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][a].  The statute at issue in this Note, 11 U.S.C. § 523, is found in 
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 67. See 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:1 (3d ed. 2008). 
 68. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1522–23. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[1].  The three other types of bankruptcy relief are set forth in Chapters 
9, 12, and 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Chapter 9 bankruptcy deals with the adjustment of a 
municipality’s debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–904, 921–930, 941–946.  Chapter 12 bankruptcy 
governs relief for family farmers and fishermen. See id. §§ 1201–1208, 1221–1231.  Lastly, 
Chapter 15 governs international bankruptcies. See id. §§ 1501–1532. 
 69. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01.  For a more detailed discussion 
of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, see infra Part I.C.1. 
 70. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01.  The order of distribution of 
assets in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
 71. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶¶ 700.01, 727.01; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 727 (governing the discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case). 
 72. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.07[1].  In the twelve-month period 
ending December 31, 2012, there were 816,271 “nonbusiness” Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petitions filed, compared to 363,280 “nonbusiness” Chapter 13 petitions. Table F-2, U.S. 
Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. CT., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/12
12_f2.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Table F-2]. 
 73. See Table F-2, supra note 72. 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) sets forth the minimum regular income requirements necessary 
for an individual to qualify for Chapter 13 protection.  This minimum dollar amount is 
adjusted every three years “to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index.” Id. § 104(a). 
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provides bankruptcy court protection and supervision in creating a 
repayment plan, taking into account the individual’s regular income.75 
A financially distressed business typically petitions under Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.76  Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides for 
the reorganization of a business.77  In a Chapter 11 case, the parties attempt 
to come to an agreement regarding how to reorganize the company, rather 
than simply liquidate it.78  The hope is that allowing the company to 
continue to operate will generate greater value than liquidating the 
company.79 
The Bankruptcy Code works in conjunction with the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (the Bankruptcy Rules), which were promulgated by 
the Supreme Court in 1983.80  The Bankruptcy Rules govern the procedure 
of cases brought forth under the Bankruptcy Code.81 
C.  Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
This section looks specifically at bankruptcy relief governed by Chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  First, this section provides an overview of a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.  Next, it explores the role and duties of the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.  Lastly, it discusses the strict nature of the 
time limits in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. 
1.  Overview of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case 
The ultimate goal of a Chapter 7 debtor is to obtain a fresh start by 
seeking a general discharge of his or her debts.82  This is accomplished 
through a liquidation procedure, managed by the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trustee, and overseen by a bankruptcy court.83  In general, the debtor’s 
assets are collected, liquidated, and then distributed to creditors according 
to an order of priority set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.84  This subsection 
will review in more detail the relevant procedure and laws of a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case. 
The first step is the initiation of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.85  There 
are two ways to commence a Chapter 7 case.86  The most common is a 
 
 75. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.07[5][d]. 
 76. In the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2012, there were 27,274 
“business” Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions filed, compared to 8,900 “business” Chapter 11 
petitions. Table F-2, supra note 72. 
 77. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1100.01. 
 78. See Daniel R. Wong, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns:  Adopting a Contract 
Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1931 (2012). 
 79. Id. at 1931–32. 
 80. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1001.02[2].  The Supreme Court is 
granted the power to prescribe bankruptcy rules pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006). 
 81. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][b]. 
 82. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 2.3, at 17–18. 
 83. See id. 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (governing the priority scheme); Id. § 726 (setting forth the Chapter 
7 distribution scheme); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01. 
 85. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.02. 
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voluntary bankruptcy case in which the debtor, facing financial hardship, 
chooses to file a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy court.87  The second 
method is an involuntary bankruptcy case in which the creditors file a 
Chapter 7 petition.88 
Once the case is initiated, either the U.S. trustee or the court appoints an 
interim trustee,89 and the bankruptcy estate is created.90  The bankruptcy 
estate, comprised of almost all of the debtor’s assets, is central to the 
bankruptcy case because it is used to pay the creditors.91  Only assets that 
are categorized as exempt are excluded from the bankruptcy estate.92  The 
status of an asset—as exempt or nonexempt—is determined by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(b).  Under § 541(b), very few property interests are categorized as 
exempt.93  Exempt assets include, inter alia, assets that a debtor controls for 
the sole benefit of another94 and interests in certain income withheld by an 
employer to be used in an employee health benefit plan.95  It is the duty of 
the trustee to collect the nonexempt assets for the bankruptcy estate, and to 
begin liquidating those assets for future distribution to the creditors.96 
During the liquidation process, the trustee receives and reviews the 
claims of the creditors.97  The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right 
to payment.”98  A debt is defined as “liability on a claim.”99  The two terms 
are interconnected; a debtor owes a debt to a creditor, and a creditor has a 
claim against a debtor.100  If the trustee believes that a claim is improper, 
then the trustee may object to the claim.101  Once the bankruptcy estate has 
 
 86. Id.  In addition to these two methods for initiating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, a 
case may also be converted to a Chapter 7 case from a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 case. Id. 
¶ 700.02. 
 87. McCoid, supra note 19, at 361 (noting that voluntary bankruptcy is more common 
than involuntary bankruptcy).  In 2010, 99.92 percent of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases 
filed were voluntary cases. See Table 7.2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Voluntary and 
Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. CT., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table702.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
 89. Id. § 701.  Either the U.S. trustee or the court initially appoints the interim trustee. 
Id.  Subsequently, at the meeting of the creditors, the general unsecured creditors may elect a 
permanent trustee. See infra note 108 and accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 702; 6 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 702.01. 
 90. 11 U.S.C. § 541; see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.02. 
 91. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01. 
 92. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01. 
 93. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01. 
 94. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1). 
 95. See id. § 541(b)(7). 
 96. Id. § 704(a)(1); 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.5.1, at 41. 
 97. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.04. 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). 
 99. Id. § 101(12). 
 100. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 n.5 (1991). 
 101. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (“The trustee shall if a purpose would be served, examine 
proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.”).  However, the 
trustee is not always required to object to an improper claim. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary 
and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 
176 (2006).  In determining whether a trustee should object, “the inquiry is whether other 
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been liquidated, and the deadline for filing claims has passed, the trustee 
will distribute the estate in accordance with the distribution scheme set forth 
in the Bankruptcy Code.102  First, secured creditors are entitled to payment 
from the liquidation of the corresponding secured property, up to the 
amount of the secured creditor’s claim.103  A secured creditor is “[a] 
creditor who has the right, on the debtor’s default, to proceed against 
collateral and apply it to the payment of the debt.”104  Then, unsecured or 
undersecured105 creditors are paid as set forth under §§ 507 and 726, with 
domestic support claims being paid first.106 
While the trustee is collecting and liquidating the debtor’s nonexempt 
assets, the bankruptcy court sends notice of the bankruptcy case to all of the 
debtor’s creditors.107  The notice contains a date for the creditors’ meeting, 
which is the creditors’ first opportunity to examine the debtor.108  In 
addition, the court’s notice also contains certain deadlines, called bar dates, 
including the bar date for objecting to the debtor’s general discharge, and 
the bar date for filing nondischargeability complaints.109  Pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) and 4007(c), these bar 
dates can be set no later than sixty days from the first date set for the 
creditors’ meeting, regardless of whether the meeting actually takes 
place.110  These bar dates can be extended by a court for cause upon a 
motion by a “party in interest.”111 
 
creditors would receive a greater distribution” if the objection was made. Id.  Therefore, in 
some situations the trustee might choose not to object if the trustee believes that the 
administrative cost outweighs the benefit of objecting to the claim. See id. 
 102. See 11 U.S.C. § 507; id. § 726; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 726.01. 
 103. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.04; Chris Lenhart, Note, Toward a 
Midpoint Valuation Standard in Cram Down:  Ointment for the Rash Decision, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1821, 1824 (1998). 
 104. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 425. 
 105. A creditor is undersecured when the sale of the secured property is insufficient to 
repay the full amount of the secured debt. See Lenhart, supra note 103, at 1824.  The 
undersecured creditor would be entitled to the full value of the secured property and then 
would be treated as an unsecured creditor with regards to the outstanding portion of the debt. 
See 11 U.S.C § 506(a). 
 106. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726.  The term “domestic support obligation” is defined by 
the Bankruptcy Code and includes alimony, maintenance, and support debts owed to “a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or 
responsible relative” or owed to a governmental unit. Id. § 101(14A).  It also includes any 
interest that accrues on those debts. Id. 
 107. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.03. 
 108. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 39.  The meeting of creditors is governed by 11 
U.S.C. § 341. 
 109. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.03.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 4007(c) requires the court to give at least thirty days’ notice of the § 523 bar date. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) requires the 
court to give at least twenty eight days’ notice of the bar date for objecting to the general 
discharge. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). 
 110. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c); see also Katherine S. Kruis, The Time 
Limitation for Objecting to the Dischargeability of Debts:  A Trap for the Unwary, 26 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 55, 60 (2001). 
 111. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b); id. R. 4007(c). 
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After the bankruptcy estate is distributed, the court typically enters an 
order of discharge, absolving the individual debtor from personal liability of 
any remaining debts.112  A debtor is not, however, guaranteed a discharge 
of all of his debts.113  There are primarily two ways in which an individual 
debtor will not be relieved of the obligation to repay his remaining debts.114  
First, the court may determine that the debtor is not entitled to a general 
discharge.115  Second, the court may grant the general discharge but 
determine that certain debts should be exempted from the discharge.116  The 
following three paragraphs discuss the procedures for determining whether 
a debtor is entitled to a general discharge and whether individual debts are 
dischargeable. 
First, a trustee, creditor, or U.S. trustee may object to the granting of a 
discharge.117  The court will then determine whether the debtor is entitled to 
a general discharge under § 727.118  Consistent with the fresh start 
policy,119 the exceptions listed in § 727(a) are meant to ensure that only 
honest debtors are able to take advantage of the bankruptcy laws.120  For 
example, the bankruptcy court is required to deny the debtor a discharge if 
the debtor fraudulently transferred or concealed assets in the year preceding 
the filing of the petition,121 or the debtor failed to keep proper records of his 
financial condition and business transactions.122  However, a denial of a 
general discharge under § 727 is considered an “extreme penalty.”123  As 
such, exceptions under § 727(a) are to be construed “liberally in favor of the 
debtor.”124 
Second, even if the bankruptcy court grants the debtor a discharge, the 
court may determine that a specific debt is nondischargeable, meaning that 
the debt is exempt from the discharge, and the creditor can go after the 
postpetition assets.125  Section 523(a) governs whether a debt is exempt 
from discharge.126  Most debts described in § 523(a) are automatically 
exempt simply because they are a type of debt that Congress has decided 
 
 112. See 11 U.S.C. § 727; 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 47–48. 
 113. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1]. 
 114. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 15.1, at 451. 
 115. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1]. 
 116. See 11 U.S.C. § 523; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 523.01. 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c). 
 118. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727 
(governing Chapter 7 debtor’s entitlement to a discharge and setting forth the grounds for 
denial of discharge). 
 119. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Irving Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Billings (In re Billings), 146 B.R. 431, 434 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 121. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). 
 122. Id. § 727(a)(3). 
 123. Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1534 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 124. Stamat v. Neary, 635 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Kontrick, 295 F.3d 
724, 736 (7th Cir. 2002)); Rosen, 996 F.2d at 1534. 
 125. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 523.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523 
(governing the dischargeability of individual debts in a Chapter 7 case). 
 126. See 11 U.S.C. § 523. 
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should survive through bankruptcy.127  These include, inter alia, taxes128 
and domestic support obligations.129  Other debts require a hearing so that a 
bankruptcy court can determine whether they are nondischargeable.130  
These debts are described in § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) and include, inter alia, 
debts obtained through fraud131 or incurred through the willful and 
malicious conduct of the debtor.132  Only a creditor can file a 
nondischargeability complaint seeking a determination from the bankruptcy 
court as to whether his claim is dischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (4), 
or (6).133 
The Bankruptcy Rules govern the procedure for objecting to the debtor’s 
right to a discharge and determining the dischargeability of an individual 
debt.134  Specifically, Rule 4004135 governs the procedure for objecting to a 
discharge, and Rule 4007136 governs the procedure for determining the 
dischargeability of an individual debt.  As stated above, a creditor, trustee, 
and U.S. trustee all have standing to object to the debtor’s discharge.137  
Only the creditor can file a nondischargeability complaint.138  Under both 
Rule 4004(a) and 4007(c), these objections must be filed within sixty days 
from the first date scheduled for the creditors’ meeting.139  These bar dates 
are strictly enforced; any motion filed after their expiration will be 
denied.140  Yet both Rules 4004(b) and 4007(c) provide that any “party in 
interest” can move for an extension of these bar dates as long as the motion 
is filed before the expiration of the bar dates.141  Upon the motion of a 
“party in interest,” the court may extend the deadlines for cause.142  As 
Part II of this Note illustrates, there is a split between the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits regarding whether a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with 
standing to move for an extension of the bar date for filing 
nondischargeability complaints.143 
 
 127. Id. § 523(a). 
 128. Id. § 523(a)(1). 
 129. Id. § 523(a)(5). 
 130. Id. § 523(c). 
 131. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 132. Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 133. Id. § 523(c)(1). 
 134. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004 (governing the procedure for challenging a general 
discharge); id. R. 4007 (governing the procedure for challenging the dischargeability of an 
individual debt). 
 135. Id. R. 4004. 
 136. Id. R. 4007. 
 137. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c). 
 138. See id. § 523(c)(1). 
 139. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c); Kruis, supra note 110, at 60. 
 140. See Anwiler v. Patchett (In re Anwiler), 958 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 141. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c). 
 142. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b)(1); id. R. 4007(c). 
 143. See infra Part II. 
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2.  Strict Enforcement of the § 523(c) Time Limitations 
This section focuses on the strict nature of the deadline for filing a 
nondischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). 
Rule 4007(c) supplements § 523(c) and provides that a 
nondischargeability complaint must be filed within sixty days of the first 
date set for the meeting of the creditors.144  This time limit is purposefully 
short and strictly enforced in order to further the prompt administration of 
the bankruptcy case and allow the debtor to obtain a fresh start 
expeditiously.145 
As the language of Rule 4007(c) indicates, the sixty-day time limit runs 
from “the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a).”146  This 
language has been interpreted to mean that the sixty-day time period runs 
from the date the first meeting of the creditors is scheduled for, regardless 
of whether the meeting of the creditors is actually held on that date.147  
Therefore, if a meeting is scheduled and then adjourned, the § 523 bar date 
is calculated based on the original date, not the adjourned date.148  This is 
one example of the strict nature of the § 523 bar date. 
While the § 523 bar date is strict, it may not be jurisdictional, meaning 
that it could be waived by a debtor if the debtor fails to raise the 
untimeliness of a nondischargeability complaint as an affirmative 
defense.149  Currently, there is a split of authority as to whether the § 523 
bar date is jurisdictional.150  If it is jurisdictional, then the court would be 
powerless to consider an untimely nondischargeability complaint regardless 
of whether the debtor raised the timeliness issue.151  While the Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed this issue, it has stated that the similar bar 
date under § 727 is not jurisdictional.152  Therefore, it is likely that the 
§ 523 bar date is also not jurisdictional and can be waived by a debtor.153 
 
 144. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). 
 145. See Torrez v. Dickinson (In re Dickinson), No. 99-1506, 2000 WL 1761065, at *2 
(10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000) (stating that Rule 4007(c) serves an important purpose and must be 
strictly enforced); State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311, 316 
(5th Cir. 2000); FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1997); Kruis, supra 
note 110, at 59 (stating that the § 523 bar date favors the debtor). 
 146. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). 
 147. DeLesk v. Rhodes (In re Rhodes), 61 B.R. 626, 629 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); Gatchell 
v. Kise (In re Kise), 84 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Kruis, supra note 110, at 60. 
 148. See DeLesk, 61 B.R. at 629; Gatchell, 84 B.R. at 37. 
 149. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 15.4.2, at 461. 
 150. Compare European Am. Bank v. Benedict (In re Benedict), 90 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that the § 523 bar date is not jurisdictional), with First Nat’l Bank in Okeene 
v. Barnes, No. 91-6183, 1992 WL 33251, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 1992) (finding that Rule 
4007(c) is jurisdictional), Dollinger v. Poskanzer (In re Poskanzer), 146 B.R. 125, 131 
(D.N.J. 1992) (finding that the § 523 bar date is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived), and 
Norwest Fin., Tex., Inc. v. Curtis (In re Curtis), 148 B.R. 465, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) 
(finding that untimely nondischargeability complaint suffered from a jurisdictional defect). 
 151. Kruis, supra note 110, at 75–76. 
 152. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a 
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. . . .  [T]he provision conferring jurisdiction 
over objections to discharge, however, contains no timeliness condition. . . .  The time 
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In addition to the strict nature of the § 523 bar date itself, the rules 
governing an extension of the bar date are restrictive; the § 523 bar date can 
only be extended as provided for under Rule 4007(c).154  Generally, Rule 
9006(a) permits a court to extend a time limitation under the Bankruptcy 
Code after the deadline has expired if “the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect.”155  However, this equitable remedy is not applicable to 
the § 523 bar date as Rule 9006(b)(3) further provides, “The court may 
enlarge the time for taking action under Rule[] . . . 4007(c) . . . only to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in [that] rule[].”156  Therefore, a 
“party in interest” must either file a nondischargeability complaint or move 
for an extension of the § 523 bar date before time expires; otherwise his 
claim is subject to a general discharge.157 
Adding to the confusion regarding Rule 4007(c), there is a split of 
authority regarding whether “piggybacking” is allowed under Rule 
4007(c).158  Piggybacking occurs when one party moves for, and is granted, 
an extension on behalf of other nonmoving parties.159  Most courts 
conclude that a “party in interest” may seek an extension of the § 523 bar 
date on behalf of other creditors, but only if the movant specifically states 
so in his moving papers.160 
As illustrated, the § 523 bar date is strictly enforced.  Failure to either 
timely file a nondischargeability complaint or move for an extension of the 
bar date will result in being barred from bringing a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) 
complaint.161 
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3.  Role and Duties of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee 
The ultimate issue of this Note, whether a trustee has standing under Rule 
4007(c), depends on the interests of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee because 
only a “party in interest” has standing.162  This section explores the roles 
and duties of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee to provide insight into a 
trustee’s interests. 
A trustee plays an important role in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case as a 
“representative of the [bankruptcy] estate.”163  As a representative of the 
estate, a trustee has both fiduciary obligations and institutional 
obligations.164  The trustee’s fiduciary obligations include the duty of 
loyalty, which requires the trustee to be disinterested in the case and 
prohibits the trustee from obtaining an interest adverse to the estate,165 as 
well as the duties of due care, accountability, competence, and diligence.166  
One of the most important fiduciary duties is the duty to maximize the 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate.167  The duty to maximize 
encompasses both the duty to maximize the value of the estate, as well as 
the duty to minimize the estate’s administrative expenses.168  As the 
Seventh Circuit has explained, “The performance of this duty will 
sometimes require [the trustee] to forbear attempting to collect a particular 
asset, because the costs of collection would exceed the asset’s value.”169 
Related to the duty to maximize are the trustee’s duties to investigate the 
financial affairs of the debtor170 and to examine and object to creditors’ 
improper claims.171  The purpose of the trustee’s duty to investigate is “to 
amass information helpful to all creditors,”172 including ensuring that the 
debtor discloses all of his property.173  Accordingly, the trustee undertakes 
the duty to investigate in the interest of the creditors generally; in other 
words, this duty is owed to the class of creditors, not to each individual 
creditor.174  Similarly, the trustee undertakes the duty to examine claims in 
the interest of the creditors as a class.175  Under the duty to examine claims, 
a trustee is not necessarily required to object to an improper claim.176  
 
 162. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). 
 163. 11. U.S.C. § 323(a) (2006). 
 164. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 147. 
 165. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271–72 (1951); Rhodes, supra note 101, at 
156. 
 166. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 172–76. 
 167. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995); Rhodes, supra 
note 101, at 165. 
 168. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 165. 
 169. In re Taxman, 49 F.3d at 315. 
 170. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4) (2006). 
 171. Id. § 704(a)(5). 
 172. In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685, 692 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 173. See In re Sebosky, 182 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
 174. See In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. at 692 (“The chapter 7 trustee has neither the duty 
nor the right to conduct an investigation designed only to aid a creditor in its individual 
nondischargeability action.”). 
 175. See Rhodes, supra note 101, at 176. 
 176. See id. 
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Rather, a trustee must determine whether objecting would increase the 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate to the other creditors.177 
Another important fiduciary duty of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is the 
trustee’s duty of diligence.178  The duty of diligence requires the trustee to 
“collect and reduce to money the property of the estate . . . as expeditiously 
as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”179  This duty 
relates to both of the major policy rationales underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code as discussed in Part I.A.2:  the interest in providing the debtor with a 
fresh start and the interest in facilitating the fair and orderly collection of 
debts owed to creditors.180 
Contrary to the fiduciary duties stated above, the trustee does not owe his 
institutional obligations to the parties of the bankruptcy case.181  Instead, 
they are separate duties derived directly from the Bankruptcy Code.182  
Institutional obligations are “established to protect the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process.”183  The most prominent institutional obligation is the 
trustee’s duty to oppose the debtor’s discharge, if advisable.184  The 
purpose of the duty to oppose the discharge is to deter future debtors from 
neglecting or ignoring their bankruptcy obligations, and to punish debtors 
who have acted improperly.185  Notably, while the trustee has a duty to 
object to the debtor’s discharge, if advisable, the trustee is not assigned a 
duty to object to the dischargeability of individual debts.186 
D.  Use of the Phrase “Party in Interest” Throughout 
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 
This section analyzes the use of the phrase “party in interest” as it is used 
throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.  This analysis will provide 
insight into whether a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c). 
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “party in interest.”187  This is 
because the phrase is an elastic concept.188  Who is considered a “party in 
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 178. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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 187. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101 
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 188. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747–49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); see In re 
Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042; Chalgren v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re 
Chalgren), No. 09-56729 ASW, 2011 WL 4753528, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) 
(“The term party in interest is meant to be elastic, and whether a party is a party in interest is 
determined by the facts of the case.”). 
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interest” may change based upon where the phrase is used in the 
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, because the meaning depends on the 
individual’s interest in the particular proceeding.189  A party may have an 
interest in one part of a bankruptcy case, but not another part of that same 
case.190  As this section will illustrate, an individual is generally considered 
a “party in interest” only if they have a financial interest, practical stake, or 
some other interest in the proceeding.191 
Occasionally, when the phrase “party in interest” is used in the 
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, the specific statute or rule will provide a list of 
certain individuals who are to be considered “parties in interest.”192  For 
example, in Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code defines a “party in interest” 
as “including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity 
security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any 
indenture trustee.”193  When these lists are provided, courts have interpreted 
them to be nonexhaustive lists of who should be considered a “party in 
interest” under that particular statute or rule.194 
A review of the circuit court decisions interpreting the phrase “party in 
interest” as it is used throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules reveals 
that an individual is considered a party in interest only if he has a financial 
interest, a practical interest, or some other interest in the outcome of the 
particular proceeding.195  The Third Circuit, in In re Amatex Corp., held 
that future asbestos victims were “parties in interest” entitled to have a 
voice in the Chapter 11 reorganization of an asbestos manufacturer.196  The 
Third Circuit specifically noted that whether or not future claimants have 
claims in the bankruptcy case is immaterial because they “clearly have a 
practical stake in the outcome of the proceedings.”197  The Third Circuit 
stated that in order to determine whether an individual is a “party in 
interest,” courts must inquire “on a case by case basis whether the 
prospective party in interest has a sufficient stake in the proceeding.”198 
In determining whether an individual is a “party in interest,” the Second, 
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have focused on whether the individual’s 
 
 189. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See Nintendo Co. v. Patten (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 71 F.3d 353, 356–57 
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financial interests are directly affected by the bankruptcy proceeding.199  
The Fourth Circuit, in Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, found 
that the owners and lienholders of a dairy farm were “parties in interest” 
with respect to the bankruptcy auction of the farm, because they “had a 
pecuniary interest in its sale.”200  The Second Circuit, however, has 
clarified that the financial interest must be direct, and that a “party in 
interest” is the party with the legal right which is sought to be enforced or 
the party entitled to bring suit.201  The Second Circuit, in Krys v. Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Refco, Inc., found that the creditor’s 
investors were not “parties in interest” because, while they had a financial 
interest in the creditor, they did not have a direct financial interest in the 
bankruptcy proceedings.202  Ultimately, as the previous cases illustrate, an 
individual cannot constitute a “party in interest” unless he has at least some 
interest in the proceedings, whether it is financial or practical.203 
II.  CONFLICT BETWEEN CIRCUITS:  WHY THE FOURTH AND SIXTH 
CIRCUITS DISAGREED ON TRUSTEES’ STANDING UNDER RULE 4007(C) 
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, it is vital that a creditor abide by the time 
limitation established for filing a nondischargeability complaint.204  If a 
creditor fails to file a timely nondischargeability complaint, the creditor will 
be barred from bringing a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) challenge to the 
dischargeability of his claim.205  In other words, the creditor will be barred 
from arguing that the debt he is owed is a nondischargeable debt acquired 
by the debtor via fraud, embezzlement, or larceny, or created as a result of a 
willful or malicious injury.206  Therefore, it is imperative that a creditor 
with a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) claim either file a timely nondischargeability 
complaint or obtain an extension of the § 523 bar date.207 
Currently, there exists a split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
regarding who constitutes a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) with 
standing to move for such an extension.208  Specifically, these circuits are 
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split as to whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee has standing to move for 
an extension on behalf of creditors.209  The Fourth Circuit, in In re Farmer, 
concluded that bankruptcy trustees are not “parties in interest” because they 
do not have a statutory duty related to, or financial interest in, the 
dischargeability of an individual debt.210  Conversely, the Sixth Circuit, in 
Brady v. McAllister, concluded that a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in 
interest.”211  The Brady court based its conclusion on the broad definition 
of the phrase “party in interest,” concerns for administrative efficiency, and 
because the trustee’s general duties give the trustee an interest in the 
dischargeability of individual debts.212 
This circuit split has resulted in confusion and inconsistent application of 
Rule 4007(c) in the lower bankruptcy courts.  The majority of bankruptcy 
courts to address this issue have aligned with the Fourth Circuit and 
concluded that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest.”213  
Nevertheless, a few of these courts have simultaneously employed equitable 
powers to permit a creditor’s untimely § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) challenge to 
stand where the creditor reasonably relied on a bankruptcy court’s order 
granting an extension based upon the trustee’s application.214 
This Part of the Note first discusses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Farmer and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. McAllister.  This Part 
will then explores some of the bankruptcy court decisions that have 
followed, specifically focusing on the equitable remedies that a few of these 
courts have employed to account for the creditor’s belief that the trustee had 
standing under Rule 4007(c) to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date 
on behalf of the creditors. 
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15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an extension of time on 
behalf of the creditors). 
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A.  The Fourth Circuit Held That a Bankruptcy Trustee Is Not a “Party in 
Interest” Under Rule 4007(c) 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to address whether a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with standing to move 
for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors.215  In In re 
Farmer, the Fourth Circuit held that the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was 
not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because the trustee did not have 
a statutory duty related to, or a financial interest in, the dischargeability of 
the individual debt.216 
In In re Farmer, Elma Speight Farmer and Mary Alice Parker Farmer 
(the Farmer debtors) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition after being sued 
in federal court on allegations of securities and investment fraud.217  The 
bankruptcy court set the § 523(c) deadline for creditors to file 
nondischargeability complaints as October 4, 1984.218  Thereafter, the 
trustee moved twice, pursuant to Rule 4007(c),219 for an extension of this 
bar date.220  The bankruptcy court granted the first extension without 
opposition.221  The Farmer debtors opposed the trustee’s second extension 
request, however, arguing that the trustee was not a “party in interest” 
entitled to request such an extension under Rule 4007(c).222  Nevertheless, 
the bankruptcy court granted the second extension.223 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, denying the second extension 
request.224  The Fourth Circuit held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a “party 
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) and therefore does not have standing to 
move for an extension of time on behalf of the creditors.225  In rendering its 
conclusion, the court acknowledged that the meaning of “party in interest” 
varies depending upon where the phrase is used in the Bankruptcy Code 
and Rules.226  An individual may be a “party in interest” with regards to 
one part of a bankruptcy case, and not a “party in interest” with regards to 
another part of the case.227  According to the Fourth Circuit, under Rule 
4007(c) a “party in interest” is limited to those parties who either have (1) a 
statutory duty related to, or (2) financial interest in the dischargeability of 
an individual debt “sufficient to justify seeking an extension on behalf of 
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the creditor.”228  The court concluded that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee 
does not satisfy either of these criteria, and therefore cannot move for an 
extension of the § 523 bar date.229 
In the first part of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a trustee 
does not have any statutory duty that would give him an interest in the 
dischargeability of an individual debt and make him a “party in interest” 
under Rule 4007(c).230  Rather, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a 
trustee’s statutory duties do make him a “party in interest” under a Rule 
4004(b) application.231  The Fourth Circuit explained that a trustee has 
standing to object to a general discharge under § 727.232  Therefore, under 
Rule 4004(b), which supplements § 727 and sets forth the time limits for 
objecting to a general discharge, a trustee “would clearly be a ‘party in 
interest’ to seek time extensions under 4004(b).”233  However, a trustee has 
no corresponding standing to object to the dischargeability of an individual 
debt under § 523.234  Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, under Rule 
4007(c), which supplements § 523, a trustee lacks any statutory duty that 
would give him an interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.235 
In addition, the Fourth Circuit rejected trustee-appellee’s argument that 
the difference in language between § 523 and the corresponding Rule 
4007(c) necessarily implies that a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 
4007(c).236  The appellee’s argument proceeded as follows:  § 523 only 
gives “creditors” the right to object to the dischargeability of an individual 
debt.  Rule 4007(c) uses a broader phrase, “any party in interest,” in 
describing who can move for an extension of the § 523 bar date.  Therefore, 
because the phrase “party in interest” includes more than just creditors, it 
must also include the trustee.237  The Fourth Circuit readily dismissed this 
argument, suggesting that the phrase “party in interest” can be broader 
without necessarily including the trustee.238  As the Fourth Circuit 
continued, a creditor may have a successor in interest who would not be a 
“creditor” under § 523, but could have an interest sufficient to be a “party in 
interest” under Rule 4007(c).239  The Fourth Circuit concluded, “Allowing a 
party who shares a community of interest with a creditor to offer a 4007(c) 
motion does not . . . extend that privilege to the trustee.”240 
Next, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a trustee’s general duties to 
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor and to assist in the 
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administration of the bankruptcy case do not give the trustee an interest in 
extending the § 523 bar date.241  The Fourth Circuit stated that the trustee’s 
general duties to investigate and to assist, set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 704, 
cannot give the trustee the power that the trustee is specifically denied 
under § 523.242  Put differently, a trustee’s general duties are insufficient to 
make the trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because the trustee 
was already denied the specific duty to object to the dischargeability of an 
individual debt under § 523.243  In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated that 
permitting the trustee to request extensions under Rule 4007(c) does not 
enhance the trustee’s ability to carry out these general duties.244  The Fourth 
Circuit did state, however, that a trustee may still investigate the 
circumstances surrounding individual debts to the extent that the 
circumstances may affect the debtor’s right to a general discharge.245  
Nevertheless, having an interest in the circumstances surrounding 
individual debts does not give the trustee an interest in the dischargeability 
of an individual debt.246 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the trustee has no financial 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.247  It stated, “‘The 
trustee acts for all the creditors so as to maximize the distribution from the 
[bankruptcy] estate,’”248 and further noted, “‘A nondischargeable debt is 
not satisfied from the estate to the detriment of the other creditors.’”249  
Rather, a creditor holding a nondischargeable debt can recover from 
postpetition assets.250  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a 
trustee, having no financial interest in postpetition assets, has no financial 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual complaint.251  Accordingly, 
a trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).252 
There exists some confusion among the bankruptcy courts regarding the 
accuracy of the Fourth Circuit’s financial interest analysis in In re Farmer.  
This disagreement centers on the Fourth Circuit’s statement that “‘[a] 
nondischargeable debt is not satisfied from the estate to the detriment of the 
other creditors.’”253  Some courts have criticized the In re Farmer decision 
as relying on the mistaken presumption that creditors holding 
nondischargeable debts can only recover from postpetition assets and do not 
 
 241. Id. at 621. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. (“The investigatory responsibility granted in 11 U.S.C. § 704 cannot give the 
trustee power that another portion of the Code denies.”). 
 244. See id. (“[W]e fail to see how permitting the trustee to file 4007(c) motions enhances 
his ability to investigate or assists in the administration of an admittedly complex case.”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 620–21. 
 248. Id. at 621 (quoting In re Overmyer, 26 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 249. Id. (quoting Overmyer, 26 B.R. at 758). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. Id. (quoting Overmyer, 26 B.R. at 758). 
962 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
share in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.254  In In re Owen-Moore, 
however, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California 
maintained that the In re Farmer court “was correctly referring to the 
portion of a nondischargeable claim paid exclusively from non-estate assets 
after the chapter 7 trustee fulfills his statutory obligations to liquidate and 
distribute estate assets to creditors.”255 
B.  The Sixth Circuit Held That a Bankruptcy Trustee Is a 
“Party in Interest” Under Rule 4007(c) 
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Brady v. McAllister, 
explicitly rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in In re Farmer.256  In 
Brady, the bankruptcy court below set the § 523 bar date for filing 
nondischargeability complaints as July 21, 1992.257  On July 20, 1992, the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee moved for and received an extension of the 
§ 523 bar date, extending the time for creditors to file nondischargeability 
complaints to October 21, 1992.258  On October 20, 1992, creditor Donald 
T. McAllister filed a complaint alleging that his $40,000 claim against the 
debtor was nondischargeable.259  In response, the debtor moved to dismiss 
McAllister’s § 523 complaint as untimely.260  The bankruptcy court denied 
the debtor’s motion to dismiss, explaining that its previous order extended 
the § 523 bar date for all creditors, including McAllister.261  The debtor 
appealed this decision.262 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the trustee had 
standing under Rule 4007(c) to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date 
on behalf of all creditors.263  The Sixth Circuit based its decision on four 
factors.264  First, while Rule 4007(a) only permits creditors and debtors to 
file a nondischargeability complaint, Rule 4007(c) more broadly provides 
that “any party in interest” can move for an extension of the § 523 bar 
date.265  Second, the Brady court suggested that a trustee does have an 
economic interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.266  Third, 
 
 254. Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1170 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Myers, 
168 B.R. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994). 
 255. In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685, 689 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the 
In re Farmer court’s language could be clearer, but nevertheless basing its interpretation on 
a careful reading of the In re Farmer court’s economic interest analysis). 
 256. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170. 
 257. Id. at 1167. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. The Brady opinion did not explain the basis of McAllister’s nondischargeability 
complaint. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 1168.  The debtor first appealed to the Western District of Kentucky. Id.  The 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id. 
 263. See id. at 1171. 
 264. See id. at 1169–71. 
 265. Id. at 1170. 
 266. See id.  The Brady court did not explicitly conclude that a trustee has an economic 
interest in obtaining an extension of the § 523 bar date; rather, the Brady court suggested this 
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giving trustees standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date 
promotes the administrative efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings.267  
Fourth, the trustee has a duty to investigate the financial affairs of a debtor 
and therefore should be considered a “party in interest.”268  Based on these 
four factors, the Sixth Circuit held that a trustee was a “party in interest” 
under Rule 4007(c) with standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar 
date.269 
This section will further explore each of the arguments presented by the 
Brady court.  First, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the plain language of Rule 
4007 and concluded that standing to move pursuant to Rule 4007(c) for an 
extension of the § 523 bar date is not restricted to those parties who have 
standing to file a § 523 nondischargeability complaint.270  As the Brady 
court indicated, the phrase “any party in interest,” as used in Rule 4007(c), 
is broader than the language used in Rule 4007(a), which provides that only 
creditors and debtors may file nondischargeability complaints.271  The 
Brady court reasoned that if the phrase “any party in interest” was similarly 
limited to debtors and creditors, it would render the difference in phrasing 
meaningless.272  Therefore, “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) is not 
limited to creditors and debtors. 273 
Second, the Sixth Circuit criticized the In re Farmer court’s conclusion 
that a trustee has no economic interest in obtaining an extension of time for 
creditors to file nondischargeability complaints.274  According to the Sixth 
Circuit, the In re Farmer court’s analysis was based on the erroneous 
presumption that nondischargeable debts are only paid out of the 
postpetition assets.275  However, “‘nondischargeable debts do share in 
estate distributions pro rata with dischargeable debts of the same class.’”276  
In other words, creditors with nondischargeable debts can recover from 
both the distribution of the bankruptcy estate and from the postpetition 
assets.277  Therefore, the Sixth Circuit suggested that a trustee does have a 
financial interest in a nondischargeable debt to the extent that the debt will 
be recovered from the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.278 
 
conclusion by criticizing the In re Farmer court’s conclusion that a trustee has no economic 
interest in obtaining an extension of the § 523 bar date. Id. 
 267. Id. (“Depriving the trustee of standing to secure additional time for creditors to file 
nondischargeability complaints could undermine the efficient administration of bankruptcy 
proceedings.”). 
 268. See id. at 1171. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. at 1170. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id.  The Brady court noted that the Farmer court itself acknowledged that “the 
inability to file a nondischargeability complaint does not preclude the ability to request 
additional time to file such a complaint.” Id.; see supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 274. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170. 
 275. Id.; see supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 276. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170 (quoting In re Myers, 168 B.R. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1994)). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. 
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Third, the Sixth Circuit stated that the court’s interest in promoting the 
efficient administration of bankruptcy proceedings supports its conclusion 
that a trustee is a “party in interest” with standing to seek an extension of 
the § 523 bar date.279  The court explained that Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases 
may have hundreds or thousands of creditors who may have suffered “from 
an elaborate scheme of consumer or securities fraud by the debtor.”280  
Therefore, the court further stated that it is impractical to have each creditor 
file an individual motion seeking an extension of time to file a 
nondischargeability complaint.281  Instead, allowing the trustee to file a 
single motion on behalf of every creditor would decrease the financial 
burdens and increase the speed of bankruptcy proceedings.282  Moreover, 
the Sixth Circuit stated that this would not unnecessarily delay the 
bankruptcy case because the creditors must still make a showing of 
entitlement to the extension.283 
Lastly, the Brady court concluded that the trustee’s general duty to 
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor, laid out in 11 U.S.C. § 704, 
further supported its conclusion that a trustee has standing under Rule 
4007(c).284  In rendering this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit again criticized 
the Fourth Circuit, stating that the In re Farmer court was misguided in 
concluding that this general duty cannot “‘give the trustee power that 
another portion of the Code denies.’”285  The Sixth Circuit explained its 
criticism, stating that the very issue at hand was whether the Code or Rules 
in fact deny the trustee standing.286 
C.  Bankruptcy Courts’ Responses to the In re Farmer and Brady Decisions 
Currently, there is confusion among the bankruptcy courts as to whether 
a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because of the split 
between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.287  In fact, some bankruptcy courts 
have initially granted a trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion, only to subsequently 
reverse course within the same case and side with the Fourth Circuit.288  
While the majority of bankruptcy courts to address this issue have 
 
 279. See id. 
 280. Id. at 1170–71. 
 281. Id. at 1171. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Id. (quoting In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Frati v. Gennaco, No. 10-11055-PBS, 2011 WL 241973, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Jan. 
24, 2011) (acknowledging the split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits); In re Owen-
Moore, 435 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (stating that the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits have come to “widely divergent results” regarding whether a trustee is a 
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c)). 
 288. See Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); Flanagan v. 
Herring (In re Herring), 116 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Tatum (In re Tatum), 60 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986). 
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ultimately aligned themselves with the Fourth Circuit,289 a few of these 
courts have nevertheless employed equitable remedies to avoid having to 
dismiss untimely § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) complaints where a creditor 
reasonably relied on a bankruptcy court’s previous order granting an 
extension of the § 523 bar date based upon the trustee’s application.290  This 
subsection briefly reviews the equitable remedies employed by these courts, 
and discusses their hesitation in dismissing these untimely complaints. 
In Flanagan v. Herring, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle 
District of Georgia agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in In re 
Farmer, but nevertheless permitted a creditor’s § 523 complaint to stand, 
because the creditor had relied on an unappealed order of the bankruptcy 
court extending the § 523 bar date.291  In Flanagan, the bankruptcy court 
initially granted the trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion, extending the § 523 bar 
date for all creditors.292  The debtor did not appeal this order.293  Then, after 
the initial bar date, but before the expiration of the new bar date, the 
creditor filed a § 523 complaint challenging the dischargeability of his 
claim.294  The debtor moved to dismiss this complaint as untimely because 
it was made after the initial § 523 bar date had expired.295  The court denied 
the debtor’s motion.296  In doing so, the bankruptcy court agreed with the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis in In re Farmer and acknowledged that the trustee 
was not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).297  Nevertheless, the court 
declined to dismiss the untimely § 523 complaint, suggesting that the debtor 
waived his right to object to the timeliness of the § 523 complaint by failing 
 
 289. Compare Silverdeer, LLC v. Deckelbaum (In re Deckelbaum), No. 10-06021-8-JRL, 
2011 WL 5909331, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 17, 2011) (“The trustee is not a ‘party in 
interest’ under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and cannot extend the deadline for filing objections 
to the discharge of specific debts under § 523.”), In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. at 688, In re 
Cooper, Nos. 02-03566, 03-00235, 2003 WL 1965711, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 7, 
2003), Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392 (acknowledging case law that questions whether a trustee has 
standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date), Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 
(suggesting that a trustee is not a “party in interest,” but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s 
§ 523 complaint to stand because the debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order 
granting an extension of the § 523 bar date), and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 60 B.R. at 338 (holding that the trustee’s motion for an extension of time in which to 
object to discharge does not extend the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors), with 
Ellsworth Corp. v. Kneis (In re Kneis), No. 08-18014(DHS), 2009 WL 1750101, at *3 
(Bankr. D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an 
extension of time on behalf of the creditors). 
 290. See Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392 (acknowledging case law that questions whether a 
trustee has standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date, but using its § 105 
equitable powers to allow the complaint to stand); Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 (suggesting 
that a trustee is not a “party in interest,” but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s § 523 
complaint to stand because the debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order granting an 
extension of the § 523 bar date). 
 291. Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315. 
 292. Id. at 314. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 315. 
 297. Id. (“This court does not disagree with the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in 
Farmer.”). 
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to appeal the erroneously granted extension.298  Accordingly, the court in 
Flanagan held that a § 523 complaint should not be dismissed where a 
creditor relied upon an unappealed order of the court.299 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina issued a 
similar order in Ruben v. Harper, declining to dismiss an untimely § 523 
complaint where the creditor relied upon an unappealed order of the court 
granting an extension.300  The Ruben court indicated that this equitable 
power derives from 11 U.S.C. § 105.301  It stated that under § 105, the court 
is required to allow a creditor’s complaint to stand where the creditor 
reasonably relied upon an unappealed order of the bankruptcy court.302  
Consequently, while the majority of the courts ultimately side with the 
Fourth Circuit in concluding that trustees are not “parties in interest” under 
Rule 4007, the inconsistent interpretation of Rule 4007 has led some 
bankruptcy courts to employ these equitable remedies to avoid dismissing 
untimely § 523 complaints where the creditor relied upon a previous court 
order granting an extension. 
III.  WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT 
Under Rule 4007(c), only a “party in interest” has standing to move for 
an extension of the § 523 bar date for filing a nondischargeability 
complaint.303  As Part I.D illustrated, the phrase “party in interest” is 
generally interpreted to include those individuals who have some interest in 
the particular proceeding, whether it be a financial interest, a practical 
interest, or some other interest.304  Because the interpretation rests on the 
individual’s interests in the particular proceeding, who is considered a 
“party in interest” can vary depending upon the specific statute or rule in 
which the phrase is used.305  An individual may have an interest with 
regards to one proceeding within a bankruptcy case, but not an interest with 
regards to another proceeding within the same case.306  Accordingly, as it is 
used in Rule 4007(c), a “party in interest” includes those parties who have a 
(1) financial, (2) practical, or (3) statutorily imposed interest in the 
dischargeability of an individual debt.307  Part III argues that a bankruptcy 
trustee does not have any interest in the dischargeability of an individual 
debt.  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit was correct in determining that a 
bankruptcy trustee was not a “party in interest” with standing to move for 
an extension of the § 523 bar date. 
 
 298. See id.; see also supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text (discussing whether a 
debtor can waive the § 523 bar date). 
 299. Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315. 
 300. Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 388, 391, 396 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). 
 301. Id. at 392; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the power 
granted to courts under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)). 
 302. Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392. 
 303. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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Part III.A argues that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in 
interest” under Rule 4007(c) because a bankruptcy trustee does not have an 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to give the 
trustee standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of 
creditors.  Part III.B argues that this conclusion is consistent with the fresh-
start policy interest of the Bankruptcy Code. 
A.  A Bankruptcy Trustee Is Not a “Party in Interest” Under Rule 4007(c) 
First, the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a bankruptcy 
trustee does not have a financial interest in the dischargeability of an 
individual debt sufficient to be a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).308  
A trustee has a financial interest in those aspects of a bankruptcy case that 
affect the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate.  
This financial interest stems from the trustee’s role in managing the 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate to unsecured and undersecured 
creditors.309  In this role, the bankruptcy trustee has a duty to maximize the 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate, including both the duties to maximize 
the value of the bankruptcy estate and to minimize the administrative 
expenses.310  The dischargeability of a claim, however, does not affect the 
collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate.  This is 
because both a dischargeable and nondischargeable debt are treated the 
same way during the distribution of the bankruptcy estate; that is, both will 
be reimbursed according to the priority list set forth in the Bankruptcy 
Code.311  Where a dischargeable debt and a nondischargeable debt differ is 
after the completion of the distribution of the estate, when a 
nondischargeable debt is still able to be collected from the postpetition 
assets.312  Since the dischargeability of an individual debt does not affect 
the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and 
does not affect the trustee’s duty to maximize the distribution of the estate, 
the trustee has no financial interest in whether or not the debt is 
dischargeable.313  As such, the bankruptcy trustee fails the first prong of the 
“party in interest” test because the trustee does not have a financial interest 
in the dischargeability of an individual debt.314 
 
 308. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text. 
 314. The Sixth Circuit, in Brady v. McAllister, erred in suggesting that a trustee has a 
financial interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt. See Brady v. McAllister (In re 
Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996).  In rendering its opinion, the Sixth Circuit merely 
critiqued the In re Farmer court’s financial interest analysis instead of providing support for 
its own conclusion. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.  However, the Brady court 
accurately stated that nondischargeable debts share in the distribution of the estate with 
dischargeable debts. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.  As indicated in the text 
accompanying notes 309–12, this supports the conclusion that dischargeability of a debt does 
not affect the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and as such, the trustee has no financial 
interest in the dischargeability of a debt. 
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Second, the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a bankruptcy 
trustee does not have a statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of 
an individual debt.315  Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits agreed that an 
individual has a statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of an 
individual debt if that individual has standing to file a nondischargeability 
complaint.316  Yet both circuits also correctly noted that a trustee does not 
have standing to file a nondischargeability complaint.317  Therefore, a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee does not have a statutorily imposed interest in 
the dischargeability of an individual debt under § 523.318  Conversely, a 
trustee does have a statutorily imposed interest in the debtor’s right to a 
general discharge because § 727 gives standing to the trustee to object to 
the general discharge.319  In fact, § 704(a)(6) specifically makes it the duty 
of the trustee to object to the granting of a general discharge, if 
advisable.320  Therefore, a trustee would be a “party in interest” under Rule 
4004(a), which corresponds to § 727, with standing to move for an 
extension of the bar date for objecting to the general discharge. 
Third, a bankruptcy trustee does not have a practical interest in the 
dischargeability of an individual debt.  An individual has a practical interest 
in a proceeding if they have a sufficient stake in the outcome of that 
proceeding.321  None of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee’s general duties, 
however, are affected by, or dependent upon, the determination of whether 
a debt is dischargeable.322  Therefore, the trustee does not have a practical 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to make the 
trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).323 
For instance, under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5), the trustee has a duty to 
review and, if necessary, object to any claim made against the bankruptcy 
estate.324  Yet this duty requires the trustee to investigate the validity of a 
claim to determine if the claim can partake in the distribution of the 
bankruptcy estate; the duty does not have anything to do with whether that 
claim will be discharged after the estate has been distributed.325  Therefore, 
the trustee’s duty to review claims does not give the trustee a practical 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.326 
 
 315. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 236–40, 270–73 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 237–38, 271 and accompanying text. 
 318. While the Sixth Circuit was correct in noting that a “party in interest” under Rule 
4007(c) is not limited to those individuals with standing to file § 523 complaints, it erred in 
suggesting that the broader language of Rule 4007(c) implies that a trustee is a “party in 
interest.” See supra note 272 and accompanying text.  Instead, an individual still needs some 
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt to be considered a “party in interest.” 
See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 117, 137 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 323. See supra notes 191, 307 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 97–101, 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that the trustee is a “party 
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because of the trustee’s general duty to 
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.327  A trustee’s § 704(a)(4) 
duty to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor is not affected by 
whether an individual debt is determined to be dischargeable and, therefore, 
does not give the trustee a practical interest in the dischargeability of an 
individual debt.328  The purpose of a trustee’s duty to investigate is “to 
amass information helpful to all creditors.”329  As such, this duty must be 
undertaken in the interest of all of the creditors; it does not permit a trustee 
to investigate matters that do not affect the creditors as a class.330  
Therefore, similar to the trustee’s duty to review claims, the § 704(a)(4) 
duty to investigate does not include a duty to investigate the 
dischargeability of an individual debt, and does not serve as a basis for 
making a trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c). 
However, as the In re Farmer court suggested, the § 704(a)(4) duty to 
investigate does not necessarily prohibit a trustee from investigating the 
circumstances surrounding individual debts.331  For example, the trustee 
may investigate the circumstances surrounding individual debts if they may 
affect the debtor’s right to a general discharge.332  Nevertheless, the trustee 
is only concerned with the individual debts to the extent that they weigh in 
on the availability of a general discharge or otherwise affect the class of 
creditors.333  The trustee is not interested in whether the individual debts 
themselves are dischargeable.334 
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that the use of the broad 
phrase “party in interest” in Rule 4007(c), as compared to the use of the 
narrower language “debtor or creditor” in Rule 4007(a), implies that a 
trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).335  As both the Fourth 
and Sixth Circuits indicated, the difference in language does suggest that 
the phrase “party in interest” is not limited to just debtors and creditors.336  
As the Fourth Circuit stated, however, the phrase “party in interest” can be 
broader without necessarily including the trustee.337  For example, in In re 
Overmyer, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that a Chapter 7 creditor’s parent company was a “party in 
interest” even though the parent company was neither a creditor nor 
debtor.338  The use of the broad language does not, by itself, imply that a 
 
 327. See supra notes 170–74, 284–86 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 175, 245 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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 337. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 338. See In re Overmyer, 26 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also supra note 
238 and accompanying text. 
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trustee is a “party in interest.”339  Instead, the trustee needs some interest in 
the particular proceedings.340  Therefore, because the trustee does not have 
a financial, practical, or statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability 
of an individual debt, the trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule 
4007(c). 
B.  Consistency with the Fresh-Start Policy Interest 
of the Bankruptcy Code 
This Note’s conclusion that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party 
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) is consistent with the fresh-start policy 
interest underlying the Bankruptcy Code.  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
“The various provisions of the bankruptcy act . . . are to be construed when 
reasonably possible in harmony with . . . the general purpose and policy of 
the act.”341  This consistency provides further support that a trustee is not a 
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).  As discussed in Part I.A.2, one of 
the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to “allow the debtor to get out 
from under the weight of his debt and resume being a contributing member 
of society.”342  Under the fresh-start theory, the Code aims to provide the 
debtor with both finality and certainty as to his expectations for relief from 
financial distress.343  In fact, the short sixty-day bar date under Rule 
4007(c) is supposed to limit delays in providing the debtor with a fresh 
start, regardless of the potentially harsh consequences of the short bar 
date.344  However, permitting the trustee to be a “party in interest” runs 
counter to this fresh-start theory.  Allowing the trustee to extend the § 523 
bar date will delay the case, potentially providing many creditors with 
additional time to file nondischargeability complaints when they otherwise 
may have been barred from doing so.345  This delays, and potentially 
hinders, the ability of the debtor to get out from under the weight of its 
debt.346  Therefore, the fresh-start policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code 
further supports the conclusion that a trustee is not a “party in interest” 
under Rule 4007(c). 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ disagreement in their interpretations of 
Rule 4007(c) has created confusion among the bankruptcy courts and 
parties to a bankruptcy case as to whether a trustee can move for an 
extension of the § 523 bar date.  First, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a 
trustee does not have standing under Rule 4007(c).  Then, the Sixth Circuit 
explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit and came to the opposite conclusion. 
 
 339. See supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
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However, this Note’s analysis of the meaning of the phrase “party in 
interest,” and the trustee’s lack of interest in the dischargeability of a debt, 
illustrate that the Fourth Circuit’s decision was the better-reasoned opinion.  
A trustee does not have a financial, practical, or statutorily imposed interest 
in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to be a “party in 
interest” under Rule 4007(c). 
